The (Hot) Dog Days of Summer: Missouri’s “Baseball Rule” Takes a Strike by Freeman, Ross H.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 80 
Issue 2 Spring 2015 Article 11 
Spring 2015 
The (Hot) Dog Days of Summer: Missouri’s “Baseball Rule” Takes 
a Strike 
Ross H. Freeman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ross H. Freeman, The (Hot) Dog Days of Summer: Missouri’s “Baseball Rule” Takes a Strike, 80 MO. L. 
REV. (2015) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 NOTE 
The (Hot) Dog Days of Summer: Missouri’s 
“Baseball Rule” Takes a Strike 
    Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184 (Mo. 2014)     
(en banc). 
ROSS H. FREEMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, over 73 million Americans attended Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”) games.1  That averages to around 30,458 fans per game.2  In base-
ball, a sport where a 100 M.P.H. pitch can result in a screaming foul ball into 
the stands, there are surprisingly few lawsuits that are successfully brought 
against MLB teams.  This is not because there are no injuries,3 but because of 
the so-called “baseball rule” and the protections that it provides MLB teams.4  
The baseball rule can be summarized as an application of primary implied 
assumption of risk – a defense to negligence that limits the liability of a ball-
park owner by eliminating a duty owed to the spectators, as long as the spec-
tators in the most dangerous seats (in terms of inherent risks of the sport of 
baseball) are protected by fencing or netting.5 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Missouri declined to extend liability pro-
tection to the Kansas City Royals to cover the antics of the team’s mascot.6  
On September 8, 2009, John Coomer was hit in the eye by a hotdog errantly 
 
* B.S., Southeast Missouri State University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Mis-
souri School of Law, 2016.  I would like to sincerely thank Professor Joshua Hawley 
for all of his help with this Note.  I would also like to thank the entire staff of the 
Missouri Law Review.  Finally, I would like to thank my family, friends, and loved 
ones for their endless love and support. 
 1. MLB Records Seventh Best Attendance Total Ever in 2014, MLB (Sept. 29, 
2014), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/96990912/mlb-records-seventh-best-attendance-
total-ever-in-2014. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See David Glovin, Baseball Caught Looking as Fouls Injure 1,750 Fans a 
Year, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2014, 3:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
09-09/baseball-caught-looking-as-fouls-injure-1-750-fans-a-year.html. 
 4. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 194-96 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc) (citing Hudson v. Kan. City Baseball Club, 164 S.W.2d 318, 320 
(Mo. 1942)). 
 5. Id. at 194-98. 
 6. Id. at 188 (“This Court holds that the risk of being injured by Sluggerrr’s 
hotdog toss is not one of the inherent risks of watching a Royals home game.”). 
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thrown by the Kansas City Royals’ mascot, Sluggerrr.7  Following a trial 
court verdict for the Kansas City Royals, the Missouri Court of Appeals for 
the Western District reversed the trial court’s ruling.8  On transfer to the Su-
preme Court of Missouri, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals for the Western District, which had reversed the trial 
court’s verdict for the Royals.9 
Part II of this Note provides the facts and holding of Coomer.  Part III 
discusses the legal background of Coomer, including the adoption of compar-
ative negligence in Missouri, Missouri’s baseball rule, and other persuasive 
baseball rule authority the court used in Coomer.  Part IV analyzes the court’s 
application of the law to the specific facts in Coomer.  Finally, Part V dis-
cusses the court’s decision and explains why the court should have adopted a 
broader definition of what constitutes an “inherent risk” of attending an MLB 
game in person. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
John Coomer was an ardent Kansas City Royals fan.10  Coomer estimat-
ed he had been to 175 Royals home games before attending the game on Sep-
tember 8, 2009.11  Coomer also admitted that he frequently watched Slug-
gerrr’s hotdog launch between innings.12  On September 8, 2009, Coomer and 
his father attended the Kansas City Royals baseball game against the Detroit 
Tigers.13  There was a smaller attendance than usual, so the Coomers chose to 
leave their seats to move to empty seats six rows behind the Tigers’ dugout.14  
Shortly after the Coomers arrived at their new seats, Sluggerrr, the Royals’ 
mascot, started the “hotdog launch,” which has been a feature of every Royals 
home game since 2000.15 
The hotdog launch consists of placing hotdogs, wrapped in bubble wrap, 
into an air gun and then shooting the hotdogs to eager fans who are rows 
away.16  While the air gun is being reloaded, Sluggerrr generally hand-tosses 
 
 7. Id. at 188-89.  For an example of Sluggerrr using a hotdog cannon, see su-
permovieron, Hot Dog Launch in Slo-Mo, YOUTUBE (May 16, 2009), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=XgtiGVahxjU. 
 8. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., Nos. WD 73984, WD 74040, 
2013 WL 150838, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), transferred, 437 S.W.3d 184 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc). 
 9. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 188. 
 10. Id. at 188. 
 11. Id. at 189. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 188. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., Nos. WD 73984, WD 74040, 
2013 WL 150838, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), transferred, 437 S.W.3d 184 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc). 
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/11
2015] THE (HOT) DOG DAYS OF SUMMER 561 
hotdogs, wrapped in foil, to fans within throwing distance.17  Sluggerrr uses 
multiple tossing motions, including behind-the-back tosses to lucky fans.18 
On this specific occurrence of the hotdog launch, Coomer was within 
throwing distance of Sluggerrr.19  Coomer testified that many fans around 
him were cheering and yelling for Sluggerrr to toss them a succulent sau-
sage.20  Coomer saw Sluggerrr turn his back and make a motion with his arm 
behind his back, signaling a likely behind-the-back-throw, but then briefly 
looked away to the scoreboard.21  During that brief moment, Sluggerrr had 
tossed a hotdog to Coomer, or to his general area, that squarely hit Coomer in 
the face, knocking off his hat.22  The velocity of the throw made Coomer 
believe that it was an overhand throw, rather than the gentler underhand 
throws that Sluggerrr had allegedly used that day.23  Showing his dedication, 
Coomer stayed for the remainder of the game and even attended the next 
night’s game.24 
Two days later, he started to believe something “wasn’t right” with his 
right eye.25  Eight days after the incident, Coomer went to a doctor and was 
diagnosed with a detached retina that required several surgeries to repair.26  
Coomer was also diagnosed with a traumatic cataract in the same eye, which 
also required surgery to repair.27  Coomer gave the Royals notice of the injury 
on the same day he visited the doctor and eventually filed suit against the 
Royals in February 2010 in the Jackson County Circuit Court, alleging bat-
tery and negligence.28 
In his initial suit, Coomer contended that the Royals “failed to exercise 
ordinary care through its agents, and failed to adequately train and supervise 
its agents.”29  The Royals’ answer asserted the defenses of implied primary 
and secondary assumption of the risk.30  At the close of Coomer’s evidence at 
trial, the Royals admitted that the employee portraying Sluggerrr “was its 
agent, servant, and/or employee and that he was acting in the scope and 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (mentioning that Sluggerrr’s tossing methods included “overhand, over 
the shoulder, behind the back . . . [and] sidearm”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., Nos. WD 73984, WD 74040, 
2013 WL 150838, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), transferred, 437 S.W.3d 184 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc). 
 30. Id. 
3
Freeman: Freeman: The (Hot) Dog Days of Summer
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
562 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
course of his employment.”31  Coomer then moved for a directed verdict as to 
the Royals’ defenses, which the trial court denied.32  The court also denied 
several of Coomer’s objections pertaining to jury instructions.33  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the Royals, placing 0% of the fault on the Roy-
als and 100% of the fault on Coomer.34  From the denial of his motion for a 
new trial, Coomer appealed the trial court’s decision.35 
On appeal, Coomer claimed instructional error as well as error by the 
trial court in denying his directed verdict as to the Royals’ defenses.36  
Coomer argued four points before the Court of Appeals for the Western Dis-
trict.37  First, he argued that the trial court erred in its jury instruction on the 
Royals’ defense of primary implied assumption of risk.38  His second argu-
ment was that “even if primary implied assumption of risk was available to 
the Royals as a defense, the trial court erred because as submitted to the jury, 
the instruction was an incorrect statement of law.”39  Third, he argued that the 
trial court erred in “permitting and instructing the jury on the Royals’ defense 
of comparative fault (secondary implied assumption of risk).”40  Finally, 
Coomer contended that the “trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
his claims for negligent supervision and training.”41 
As to Coomer’s first point, that a mascot throwing hotdogs at fans is not 
an inherent or unavoidable risk of playing baseball, the appellate court re-
versed the trial court, finding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury 
on implied assumption of risk.42  The appellate court explained that inherent 
risks of an activity are “perfectly obvious or fully comprehended” and repre-
sent dangers that are “known and appreciated.”43  The instruction to the jury, 
concerning whether a hotdog thrown by a mascot was an inherent risk of 
watching a Royals home game, was in error because that is a question for the 
court, not for the jury.44  Coomer’s second point was rendered moot, and the 
appellate court declared that the trial court did not err in Coomer’s third and 
 
 31. Id. at *2. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at *3 (“Inherent risks are those that inure in the nature of the sport itself.”) 
(citing Sheppard ex rel. Wilson v. Midway R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262-63 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995)). 
 43. Id. (citing Martin v. Buzan, 857 S.W.2d 366, 368-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 44. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc). 
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fourth points.45  The comparative fault jury instruction (point three) and the 
negligent supervision and training instruction (point four) are not included in 
this Note, as the Court of Appeals ruled the trial court did not err in these 
specific instructions.46 
The case was then transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri.47  That 
court held, as a matter of law, that “the risk of being injured by Sluggerrr’s 
hotdog toss is not one of the inherent risks of watching a Royals home 
game.”48  The court focused on the fact that baseball can be played without 
tossing hotdogs to fans, stating that “[t]he risk of being injured by Sluggerrr’s 
hotdog toss . . .  is not an unavoidable part of watching the Royals play base-
ball.”49  The court went on to say that the risk of being hit by a hotdog thrown 
by a mascot is no more inherent in watching a game of baseball than it is 
inherent in “watching a rock concert, a monster truck rally, or any other as-
semblage where free food or T-shirts are tossed into the crowd to increase 
excitement and boost attendance.”50 
The court, in deciding to vacate the judgment for the Royals, determined 
that Coomer’s claim was not barred by the assumption of risk doctrine and 
that it was up to the jury to decide (1) whether Sluggerrr injured Coomer with 
the thrown hotdog and (2) whether Sluggerrr was negligent in doing so.51 
As discussed below, the “baseball rule” is an application of the implied 
primary assumption of risk doctrine, specialized for the MLB and other sport-
ing events.52  The court, in vacating the judgment for the Royals, declined to 
extend the protection of the baseball rule to other events within the stadium, 
such as antics by a mascot.53  Thus, the court further narrowed the baseball 
rule to only cover risks of injury that are inherent dangers of watching the 
sport of baseball in person.54  The Supreme Court of Missouri, in vacating the 
judgment for the Royals and remanding the case for further proceedings, 
held: (1) that the question of whether being hit by a thrown hotdog is an in-
herent risk of attending a baseball game was a decision for the court and not 
the jury, (2) that being hit by a hotdog is not an inherent risk of attending a 
baseball game, (3) that the jury instructions requiring the jury to determine if 
it was an inherent risk were prejudicial towards Coomer, and (4) that the is-
sue of comparative fault was a question for the jury.55  When a team’s mascot 
 
 45. Coomer, 2013 WL 150838, at *4-5. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d 184. 
 48. Id. at 188. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 194 (“One of the most interesting – and certainly the most relevant – 
applications of implied primary assumption of risk involves certain risks assumed by 
spectators at sporting events.”). 
 53. Id. at 200-01. 
 54. Id. at 199. 
 55. Id. at 188. 
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injures a spectator at a baseball game, the baseball rule does not preclude 
damages for the fan’s injury if the team’s mascot acted negligently.56 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Comparative Fault in Missouri: Gustafson v. Benda 
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Missouri adopted the comparative fault 
doctrine in Gustafson v. Benda.57  The specific facts of that case are not rele-
vant to this Note.  Before proceeding to apply the baseball rule in Coomer, 
the court had to determine which contributory negligence defenses survived 
Missouri’s adoption of the comparative fault doctrine.58 
B.  Missouri’s Baseball Rule 
The baseball rule is an application of the assumption of risk doctrine, 
which is a defense to the tort of negligence.59  To establish a claim of negli-
gence in Missouri, a claimant is required to show that (1) the defendant had a 
duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect the claimant from unrea-
sonable risks, (2) that duty was breached, (3) the breach of duty proximately 
caused the claimant’s injury, and (4) the claimant suffered damages.60  Defin-
ing assumption of risk, the court stated that “if a person voluntarily consents 
to accept the danger of a known and appreciated risk, that person may not sue 
another for failing to protect him from it.”61  The defense of primary implied 
assumption of risk, when successful, negates the existence of the duty ele-
ment of negligence.62  Since the defendant has no duty to protect a claimant 
from the inherent risks of an activity in which the claimant voluntarily partic-
ipated, the defendant cannot be held liable under the tort of negligence.63 
Before proceeding to the baseball rule, it is important to differentiate be-
tween the different variations of the assumption of risk doctrine.  The express 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (“[T]his and future cases shall ap-
ply the doctrine of pure comparative fault in accordance with the Uniform Compara-
tive Fault Act [Sections] 1-6.”). 
 58. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text. 
 59. Matthew J. Ludden, Recent Development, Take Me Out to the Ballgame . . . 
But Bring a Helmet: Reforming the “Baseball Rule” In Light of Recent Fan Injuries 
at Baseball Stadiums, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 123, 127 (2013). 
 60. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., Nos. WD 73984, WD 74040, 
2013 WL 150838, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), transferred, 437 S.W.3d 184 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc). 
 61. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 191 (citing Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 
1982) (en banc)). 
 62. Coomer, 2013 WL 150838, at *3 (citing Ivey v. Nicholson-McBride, 336 
S.W.3d 155, 157-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)). 
 63. Id. 
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assumption of risk doctrine states that “when a plaintiff makes an express 
statement that he is voluntarily accepting a specified risk, the plaintiff is 
barred from recovering damages for an injury resulting from that risk.”64  
Implied assumption of risk exists where, even though a plaintiff does not 
expressly accept a specified risk through a waiver or in a verbal acquiescence, 
that plaintiff still impliedly assumes the risk through his or her conduct and 
the surrounding circumstances.65  Implied primary assumption of risk is de-
fined as a risk that arises from the circumstances or a risk that is inherent in 
an activity or on a property.66  Implied secondary assumption of risk is de-
fined as a risk that is created by the defendant’s negligence.67  The baseball 
rule is an application of the primary implied assumption of risk doctrine.68 
Missouri first recognized that there were inherent dangers in attending 
baseball games for spectators over 100 years ago in Crane v. Kansas City 
Baseball & Exhibition Co.69  In Crane, the defendants were owners of a 
baseball park and the plaintiff was a spectator at the defendants’ park.70  Cer-
tain seats at the defendants’ park were “safe” in that there was mesh fencing 
to protect spectators from foul balls, while other seats did not have a mesh 
fence between them and the ball field.71  The plaintiff, who was not sitting in 
one of the “safe” seats, was injured by a foul ball and sued, claiming that the 
defendants were negligent in not screening all of the seats from foul balls.72  
The court did not go so far as to say that the defendants had no duty to specta-
tors at their park whatsoever, but instead stated that the defendants “were 
bound to exercise reasonable care, i.e., care commensurate to the circum-
stances of the situation, to protect their patrons against injury.”73  The court 
held that the defendants had exercised reasonable care by providing seating 
that was “safe” from foul balls and that the defendants had the opportunity to 
sit in those seats.74 
It was important to the baseball rule analysis in Crane that the plaintiff 
had chosen to sit in the seat he did, likely because there was no fence ob-
structing his view of the game.75  By sitting in the unprotected seat, he as-
sumed the risk of his specific position in the stadium.76  As the plaintiff chose 
the more dangerous of the two types of seats, with full knowledge of the dan-
 
 64. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 191. 
 65. Id. at 192. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 69. 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1077-78. 
 72. Id. at 1077. 
 73. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 74. Id. at 1078. 
 75. Id. (finding that the plaintiff’s change of seat was “doubtless for the purpose 
of avoiding the annoyance of the slight obstruction to vision offered by the netting”). 
 76. Id. 
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gers of being a spectator in a baseball park, he did not exercise reasonable 
care, barring his recovery under the contributory negligence doctrine.77 
The second major baseball rule case in Missouri was Edling v. Kansas 
City Baseball & Exhibition Co., decided one year later in 1914.78  As with 
Crane, the plaintiff in this case was a spectator at the defendant’s baseball 
park.79  Unlike Crane, however, this plaintiff chose to sit in the “safe” seats in 
the grandstand, rather than the unprotected seats the plaintiff in Crane sat 
in.80  A foul ball went off a bat and proceeded through a large hole in the 
mesh fencing, hitting the plaintiff in the face and breaking his nose.81  The 
plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence, alleging that the “defendants neg-
ligently and carelessly permitted the screening on said grand stand to . . . be-
come old, rotten, worn, and defective, and negligently and carelessly permit-
ted holes large enough to permit the passage of a baseball to . . . remain in 
said screening in said grand stand.”82  The plaintiff also alleged that the de-
fendants knew of the dangerous condition of the screening and failed to fix 
the screening prior to the accident.83  The court determined that the defendant 
did not meet its duty of care because it did not exercise reasonable care to 
protect its spectators in the grandstand seating by maintaining the mesh fenc-
ing that protected those spectators from foul balls.84 
The third major baseball rule case in Missouri came in 1942 with Hud-
son v. Kansas City Baseball Club.85  Mr. Hudson, the plaintiff, intended on 
sitting in a seat that was protected behind the wire netting and had presumed 
he was sitting in a seat that was protected from foul balls.86  However, Mr. 
Hudson was mistaken and was subsequently hit in the face with a foul ball.87  
Hudson sued, claiming that the defendant “disregarded its obligation of fur-
nishing a fee paying spectator reasonable protection from injury while attend-
ing a baseball game,” that the defendant’s premises were not safe, and that 
the defendant “failed to fulfill its duty ‘to erect some protection across a line 
running from home plate to any seat in the grandstand to which the public 
[was] invited and which [was] within ordinary reach of a foul ball.’”88 
 
 77. Id.  Note that in Crane, the contributory negligence doctrine was still the law 
in Missouri, as compared to the comparative negligence doctrine adopted in Gus-
tafson in 1983 and applied in Coomer.  See Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 
1983) (en banc). 
 78. 168 S.W. 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914). 
 79. Id. at 908. 
 80. Id. at 909. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 910. 
 85. 164 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. 1942). 
 86. Id. at 319. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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The court, in ruling for the defendant, stated that part of the attraction of 
attending a baseball game is the thrill of catching a foul ball and that “[o]ne 
who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as 
they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by 
his antagonist.”89  The court held that “[i]n baseball the patron participates in 
the sport as a spectator only, but in so doing subjects himself to the dangers 
necessarily and usually incident to and inherent in the game.”90  One does not 
assume the risk of being injured by the stadium owner’s negligence, but “by 
voluntarily entering into the sport as a spectator he knowingly accepts the 
reasonable risks and hazards inherent in and incident to the game.”91 
In making its decision, the court noted that Mr. Hudson was a person 
with actual knowledge of the dangers of the game of baseball, that he had 
attended many games before, and that he would have noticed that he was not 
sitting in a seat protected by netting had he been looking.92  The court deter-
mined that the position of the spectator in a seat where he knew that he might 
be hit by a foul ball was particularly important, as he “voluntarily elected to 
watch the game with full knowledge of the dangers incident to it and of the 
possibility of injury to himself.”93 
Missouri’s contemporary baseball rule was concisely stated in 1950 in 
Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club: 
[w]here a baseball game is being conducted under the customary and 
usual conditions prevailing in baseball parks, it is not negligence to 
fail to protect all seats in the park by wire netting, and that the special 
circumstances and specific negligence pleaded did not aid plaintiff or 
impose upon the defendant a duty to warn him against hazards which 
are necessarily incident to baseball and are perfectly obvious to a per-
son in possession of his faculties.94 
In Anderson, the plaintiff (“Mrs. Anderson”), an individual with no 
knowledge of the risks of attending a baseball game, was seated by the de-
fendant’s employee in a seat unprotected by netting.95  After being seated, 
Mrs. Anderson was hit with a foul ball.96  She asserted negligence, claiming 
that the defendant knew of the dangers of baseball and did not warn her of 
those dangers or provide additional safeguards or protections for fans seated 
 
 89. Id. at 323. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 92. Id. at 324. 
 93. Id. at 324-25. 
 94. Anderson v. Kan. City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo. 1950) 
(emphasis added). 
 95. Id. at 171 (finding that “plaintiff was wholly unaware and ignorant of such 
hazard”). 
 96. Id. 
9
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outside of the protected netted area.97  Mrs. Anderson’s second claim was that 
she was seated in a protected seat behind netting, that the defendant’s em-
ployee moved her to an unprotected seat, and that the employee assured her 
that the unprotected seat was safe because “hundreds of people sat there every 
day.”98 
The court held that the duty to exercise ordinary care to provide specta-
tors with a reasonably safe place to watch baseball was fulfilled when “those 
portions of the stands which are most frequently subject to the hazard of foul 
balls are screened and when screened seats are provided for as many as may 
reasonably be expected to desire to use them.”99  Even if this duty is fulfilled, 
a risk remains that those in unprotected seats may be injured, as the risk of 
being hit by a foul ball is a “necessary and inherent part of the game and re-
mains after ordinary care has been exercised to provide the spectators with 
seats which are reasonably safe.”100  The court further stated that this risk is 
assumed by spectators as it remains after due care has been exercised by the 
park owner and is not a result of negligence by the park owner.101  Because 
this risk is inherent in the game, and clearly not unreasonable, no duty to 
warn of the danger was required by the park owner or its employees.102 
These cases show that the baseball rule protects baseball teams in that if 
a baseball team exercises reasonable care to protect spectators from the harm 
that follows the inherent risks of baseball, the baseball team will not be held 
liable for injuries to spectators.103  However, a question remained in Missouri 
as to whether the baseball rule prevented liability for baseball teams for the 
actions of the team’s mascot or other employees until Coomer was decided. 
C.  Persuasive Baseball Rule Authority 
The Supreme Court of Missouri relied heavily on Lowe v. California 
League of Professional Baseball104 in making its decision in Coomer.105  In 
Lowe, the Rancho Cucamonga Quakes’ mascot repeatedly jostled and inter-
fered with a spectator who was subsequently hit with a foul ball.106  The mas-
cot, a seven-foot-tall dinosaur, repeatedly hit the plaintiff with his tail for 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 173 (internal citations omitted). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 105. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 198 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc) (“One example, useful both for its facts and its analysis, is Lowe v. 
California League of Professional Baseball.”). 
 106. Lowe, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106. 
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close to two whole minutes before the foul ball hit the plaintiff.107  It was 
important to the Lowe court’s determination of whether a mascot is an inte-
gral part of attending a baseball game in person that the individual who 
played the mascot in Lowe “recounted that there were occasional games 
played when he was not there.”108 
The Lowe court noted that a defendant has a duty to not increase the in-
herent risks spectators assume and are regularly exposed to at professional 
baseball games.109  The Lowe court, in reversing a grant of summary judg-
ment for the ballpark owner defendant, held that, as a matter of law, the risk 
of being injured by a mascot’s antics was not an inherent risk of attending a 
baseball game and that it is up to a jury to decide if the mascot’s actions in-
creased the inherent risks to the plaintiff of attending the baseball game.110 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the base-
ball rule did not preclude damages for the alleged negligent acts of a team’s 
mascot when the alleged negligent act was not an inherent risk of the sport of 
baseball.111  The court held that as a matter of law the risk of being injured by 
a hotdog thrown by Sluggerrr was not an inherent risk of attending a Kansas 
City Royals baseball game.112  The court relied on Lowe v. California League 
of Professional Baseball in determining that a mascot’s antics are not consid-
ered to be an inevitable and unavoidable risk of playing the game of base-
ball.113  The Coomer court focused on the Lowe court’s analysis of what con-
stitutes an inherent risk, which was defined as “some feature or aspect of the 
game which is inevitable or unavoidable in the actual playing of the game.”114  
In addition to relying on the Lowe court’s analysis of what an inherent risk is, 
the Coomer court looked to the Webster dictionary’s definition of “inherent,” 
finding it to be defined as “structural or involved in the constitution or essen-
tial character of something: belonging by nature or settled habit.”115 
The Coomer court held that, because being injured by a hotdog thrown 
by Sluggerrr was not an inherent risk of watching baseball in person, and 
because the Royals’ negligence increased one of the inherent risks that in-
jured Coomer as a result, a jury is entitled to hold the Royals negligent and 
 
 107. Id. at 109 (“For a period of at least two minutes, Tremor whacked the back of 
Mr. Lowe’s head; back and shoulder with the tail portion of the Tremor costume.”). 
 108. Id. at 111.  This was in contrast to Sluggerrr, a mascot who is a staple at 
every Kansas City Royals home game.  Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 188. 
 109. Lowe, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106. 
 110. Id. at 111. 
 111. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 188. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Lowe, 65 Cal. Rptr. 105. 
 114. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 198 (citing Lowe, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111). 
 115. Id. at 201 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1163 
(1966)). 
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that the fault will be apportioned under the traditional comparative fault doc-
trine.116  The court further held that determining what constitutes an inherent 
risk is a matter of law and that as a matter of law, being injured by Slug-
gerrr’s hotdog toss was not an inherent risk of watching a baseball game in 
person.117  The court differentiated between a spectator being injured by a 
foul ball and a spectator being injured by the actions of a team’s mascot by 
noting that a team owner cannot completely remove the risk of being hit by a 
foul ball without materially changing the actual sport of baseball.118  Howev-
er, baseball had been played for more than 100 years without the antics of 
Sluggerrr or any other mascot being a part of the stadium experience.119 
As the court further explained, Sluggerrr’s actions were not considered 
an inherent risk of attending a baseball game because the hotdog launch was 
not a part of baseball and was only a means to entertain the fans when base-
ball was not being played.120  The court stated that the hotdog launch was not 
so intertwined with the sport of baseball that the Royals could not control or 
limit the risk without completely abandoning the sport.121  Importantly for the 
comparative fault determination by a jury, the court explained that there was 
a negligent and a non-negligent way of tossing a hotdog and that Sluggerrr 
could decide which toss to use.122 
In its analysis, the court first had to determine whether the defense of 
assumption of risk survived Missouri’s adoption of the comparative fault 
doctrine.123  The doctrine of assumption of risk is summarized as follows: 
“[I]f a person voluntarily consents to accept the danger of a known and ap-
preciated risk, that person may not sue another for failing to protect him from 
it.”124  The court determined that the defenses of express assumption of risk 
as well as implied primary assumption of risk survived Missouri’s adoption 
 
 116. Id. at 199. 
 117. Id. at 188. 
 118. Id. at 202. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 202-03 (“Sluggerrr may make breaks in the game more fun, but 
Coomer and his 12,000 rain-soaked fellow spectators were not there to watch Slug-
gerrr toss hotdogs; they were there to watch the Royals play baseball.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 203 (“[N]ot only is being injured by Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss not an 
inherent risk of watching a Royals game, it is not an inherent risk of the Hotdog 
Launch. . . .  [T]he Royals concede that there are negligent and non-negligent ways of 
tossing a hotdog and that Sluggerr[r] (for whom the Royals are responsible) can con-
trol which he uses.”). 
 123. Id. at 191.  Missouri adopted the comparative fault doctrine in Gustafson v. 
Benda.  661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). 
 124. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 191 (citing Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 
1982) (en banc)). 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/11
2015] THE (HOT) DOG DAYS OF SUMMER 571 
of the comparative fault doctrine, while the defense of implied secondary 
assumption of risk did not survive.125 
The comparative fault doctrine Missouri has adopted closely resembles 
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (“UCFA”).126  Section 1(a) of the UCFA 
provides that “any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes 
proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury 
attributable to the claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.”127  
Section 1(b) “defines ‘fault’ for purposes of Section 1(a) to include unreason-
able assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent.”128  
Thus, “[w]hen a plaintiff acts unreasonably in deciding to assume a risk cre-
ated by a defendant’s negligence, such ‘fault’ may reduce – but not bar – the 
plaintiff’s recovery under Gustafson.”129  Using the same logic, if a claimant 
acted reasonably, the claimant’s decision cannot be used to diminish his re-
covery, as reasonable behavior does not constitute fault under Gustafson.130 
The Supreme Court of Missouri summarized its decision by holding that 
“when the plaintiff is injured by the defendant’s negligence, . . . the adoption 
of comparative fault in Gustafson precludes any consideration of the plain-
tiff’s conduct in assuming that risk (i.e., implied secondary assumption of 
risk) except as a partial defense under a proper comparative fault instruc-
tion.”131  As the express and implied primary applications of assumption of 
risk “result in determinations that the defendant has no duty to protect the 
plaintiff, the form of comparative fault adopted in Gustafson does not pre-
clude these applications as a complete – not merely a partial – bar to the 
plaintiff’s recovery.”132 
V.  COMMENT 
The court should have ruled in favor of the Kansas City Royals for two 
reasons: policy and precedent.  Because Missouri does not recognize different 
degrees of negligence,133 the proper cause of action to use in holding a ball-
park owner liable for injuries to spectators should be that of recklessness.  In 
other words, if a mascot or an employee of the ballpark owner acted reckless-
ly, causing an injury to a spectator, the owner would be liable.  However, 
with the court’s decision, ballpark owners are now much more at risk of liti-
gation that could result in increased ticket prices, discouraging spectators 
 
 125. Id. at 192-93 (“As a result, Gustafson rejects any further application of ‘im-
plied secondary assumption of the risk.’”). 
 126. Id. (citing Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 18). 
 127. Id. at 192. 
 128. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 192-93. 
 131. Id. at 194. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (“It also 
remains the law of Missouri that there are no legal degrees of negligence.”). 
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from attending games and forcing ballpark owners from taking part in “fun” 
interactions with fans.  These activities have become part of the total in-game 
experience of attending a baseball game.  The tradition of fan interaction 
could become a thing of the past.134  Spectators have come to expect fan in-
teractions, coupled with the entertainment of the game, when attending pro-
fessional sporting events in person. 
 
A.  Policy: This Decision Will Harm MLB Teams, and, in Turn, 
MLB Fans 
 
All of those events that ballpark owners have created to add to the ball-
park in-game experience should be included under the protections of the 
baseball rule.  One could argue that the definition of an inherent risk of at-
tending a baseball game in person differs from the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri’s definition.  The inherent risks of attending a baseball game in person 
consist of not only “some feature or aspect of the game which is inevitable or 
unavoidable in the actual playing of the game,”135 but also, citing Webster’s 
Dictionary definition of inherent, all of those things that are “structural or 
involved in the constitution or essential character of something: belonging by 
nature or settled habit.”136  It can be argued that the different fan interactions 
that ballpark owners have developed, such as Sluggerrr’s hotdog launch, have 
become as much a part of the fan experience as catching a foul ball.  These 
fan interactions belong by settled habit, as teams rely on these events to boost 
attendance by exciting fans during the downtime of baseball games.  Fans 
have become accustomed to these fan interactions and eliminating or signifi-
cantly marginalizing these events could decrease fan attendance. 
In 2013, the Wall Street Journal calculated that the average fan attend-
ing a MLB game would see 17 minutes and 58 seconds worth of actual “ac-
tion” during the three-hour average MLB game.137  Therefore, the average fan 
is guaranteed to see “a bunch of grown men standing in a field, doing abso-
lutely nothing” for around two hours and forty minutes during an average 
MLB game.138  The MLB has recognized this problem and the MLB’s “Pace 
 
 134. Mark Chenoweth, Swing and a Miss: Missouri Supreme Court Rules Against 
Hot Dog Toss at Ballgames, FORBES (July 30, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/07/30/a-swing-and-a-miss-by-the-missouri-supreme-court/. 
 135. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 198 (citing Lowe v. Cal. League of Prof. Baseball, 
65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 136. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1163 (1966) (emphasis 
added). 
 137. Steve Moyer, In America’s Pastime, Baseball Players Pass A Lot of Time, 
WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100
01424127887323740804578597932341903720. 
 138. Id. 
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of Game Committee” has developed six new initiatives to speed up the game 
of baseball.139 
So what do fans do during the other 90% of the game they paid good 
money to see?  Teams have tried to convince fans to leave their couch, where 
they can view multiple games at once and have access to instant replays, and 
attend the games in real life instead.  Not only do ballpark owners compete 
with television, they compete with each other.  Teams are constantly trying to 
create new ballpark foods and beverages, provide services such as free Wi-Fi, 
and create new fan interactions that justify the ticket price for the attendee.140  
Teams are even building mini theme parks, having fireworks nights, and host-
ing rock concerts to draw in fans.141  In Coomer, the hotdog launch had been 
a feature of every single Royals home game since 2000.142  The hotdog 
launch was created to excite the fans as well as to provide free hotdogs to 
fans near Sluggerrr.143 
For an example of a fan’s experience at a baseball game, the most popu-
lar food that fans consume at games has long been the hotdog.144  Chris Bige-
low, a consultant to stadium concessionaries, said: “It must be a Pavlovian 
response: you come to a ballpark, you have to have a hotdog.”145  Most 
hotdog historians agree that hotdogs were introduced to baseball around 
1895.146  Since then, and despite teams introducing items such as sushi 
stands, steak restaurants, and other catered food, hotdogs have been consid-
ered the “king” of ballpark foods.147  To some, the hot dog “is the highlight of 
coming to the stadium.”148  Teams like the Royals know that some fans come 
to the games solely for the ballpark food and other fan interactions.  To fur-
ther incentivize leaving their home, the teams will create events that the at-
 
 139. Paul Hagen, Pace of Game Initiatives to be Tested at AFL, MLB (Oct. 1, 
2014), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/97181194/pace-of-game-initiatives-to-be-tested
-at-afl.  As the title states, these initiatives will be tested in the minor leagues first.  Id. 
 140. Hot Dog Lawsuit May Affect Fan Experience, USA TODAY (Nov. 1, 2013, 
1:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/royals/2013/11/01/hot-dog-
lawsuit-may-affect-fan-experience/3349921/ (“From mascot races and T-shirt can-
nons to free Wi-Fi and stadium sushi stands, teams have been doing everything they 
can to convince fans that the live experience is worth the high ticket and concession 
prices and is better than watching games on television.”). 
 141. Mark Koba, Keeping Fans in the Stands Is Getting Harder To Do, YAHOO 
SPORTS (July 7, 2013, 9:09 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nba--keeping-fans-in-
the-stands-is-getting-harder-to-do-005355696.html. 
 142. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Ken Belson, Forget the Spicy Tuna Rolls; Most Fans Still Want a Dog, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/sports/baseball/13hot-
dogs.html. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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tendees desire, not only to create the possibility of receiving a free hotdog or 
snack, but also to create excitement in an otherwise dull moment when there 
is no action on the diamond.149  Fans purchasing a ticket to an MLB game are 
purchasing a ticket for those activities that come with the total in-game expe-
rience. 
Between-inning antics by mascots, as well as other interactions such as 
shooting T-shirts or throwing hotdogs, are part of the experience of witness-
ing an MLB game in person.  The ruling in Coomer has the potential to se-
verely limit the entertainment provided by ballpark owners when the game is 
not being played.  “With this ruling, the message now has been sent to all 
mascots and teams that they may be liable for any injuries fans suffer because 
of their actions at games.”150  Ballpark owners have two major options under 
Coomer: eliminate any activities with fans that may produce negligent inju-
ries, which will reduce some of the “fun” of attending a game in person, or 
completely stop fan interactions by the mascot or other ballpark employ-
ees.151  A minor change that ballpark owners could choose would be to train 
mascots and ballpark employees to not act negligently, such as to only throw 
hotdogs to fans who are looking.  Ballpark owners could also just decide to 
simply pay for these judgments as they occur without making changes.  Re-
gardless of how ballpark owners respond, Coomer incentivizes ballpark own-
ers to reduce or eliminate fan interactions with ballpark employees or mas-
cots. 
The Coomer court misconstrued what fans expect when they attend an 
MLB game.  The court stated: “Sluggerrr may make breaks in the game more 
fun, but Coomer and his 12,000 rain-soaked fellow spectators were not there 
to watch Sluggerrr toss hotdogs; they were there to watch the Royals play 
baseball.”152  The court took a very narrow approach to why spectators attend 
baseball games in person.  The court’s assumption does not account for the 
possibility that some fans attend games not only to witness the game of base-
ball, but also for the total in-stadium experience of attending an MLB game.  
MLB spectators not only desire fan interaction, but they expect fan interac-
tion for the price of admission, rather than just attending the stadium to simp-
ly watch the game.  If fans decide that the cost of attendance to an MLB game 
without fan interaction is too high, then fans will simply choose to stay at 
home, where they can watch the same baseball game and save their money. 
Another policy argument against the Coomer decision is that the law 
protects ballpark owners from liability from flying bats, balls, and even play-
 
 149. Garrett R. Broshuis, Death to the Crazy Hot Dog Vendor?: The Continued 
Erosion of the Baseball Rule After Coomer v. Kansas City Royals, SPORTSLAW.ORG, 
https://www.sportslaw.org/docs/Continued_Erosion_of_the_Baseball_Rule.pdf. 
 150. Joshua Winneker & David Gargone, At Sporting Events, Beware the T-Shirts 
Cannon, PENNLIVE (July 27, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/
2014/06/at_sporting_events_beware_the.html. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 203 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc). 
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ers injuring spectators, but that a flying hotdog is not protected.153  The court 
assumes that fans are on alert from the inherent risks of the actual sport of 
baseball, but that they are not alert of their surroundings at other times.154  
This “defies logic and common sense.”155  This lawsuit is “an example of 
continuing growth in lawsuits that tend to strip away whimsical fun and re-
duce everything to sterile ‘safe’ entertainment.”156 
The Coomer court has opened the floodgates of litigation for profes-
sional sports teams in Missouri by attendees injured by mascots or employees 
of ballpark owners.  Litigation is very expensive, and to compensate, teams 
will likely increase ticket prices to combat litigation costs.  Thus, litigation 
hurts both the ballpark owner as well as the average spectator.  In the alterna-
tive, park owners could cease fan interactions that could lead to negligent 
injury, reducing the reasons why a fan would want to attend a game in per-
son.  Yet, many spectators buy a ticket not only for the sport but also for all 
the in-stadium activities that accompany the game.  Eliminating fan interac-
tion hurts both the ballpark owners and the spectators.  The Coomer decision 
will impact not only Missouri’s two MLB teams, but also minor league base-
ball teams and potentially other professional sporting events such as National 
Hockey League games. 
B.  Precedent 
Had the court adopted a broader view of the definition of the “inherent 
risks” of attending an MLB game in person, existing case law would not con-
flict with it.  For instance, if the court had held that spectators assume the risk 
of not only the inherent dangers of baseball, but also of potentially negligent 
fan interactions by mascots and ballpark employees, then there would be 
much greater protections for ballpark owners.  This protection benefits ball-
park owners as well as the average fan.  Had the court extended the protec-
tions of the baseball rule to mascot antics for MLB teams, the ruling would 
not conflict with Missouri case law.  It can also be argued that Lowe, the per-
suasive authority from California on which the Coomer court relied, repre-
sents reckless conduct, and not merely negligent conduct.157 
In Hudson,158 a spectator who thought he was in a seat protected from 
foul balls was subsequently hit by a foul ball.159  Mr. Hudson had attended 
many games before and had full knowledge of the dangers that attending a 
 
 153. Chenoweth, supra note 134. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Logan Penza, Missouri Baseball Fans Can Sue Mascot for Negligence, 
MODERATE VOICE (July 7, 2014), http://themoderatevoice.com/196569/missouri-
baseball-fans-can-sue-mascot-for-negligence/. 
 157. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text. 
 159. Hudson v. Kan. City Baseball Club, Inc., 164 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Mo. 1942). 
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baseball game in person presents.160  The court, in ruling for the defendant 
ballpark owner, stated that Mr. Hudson “voluntarily elected to watch the 
game with full knowledge of the dangers incident to it and of the possibility 
of injury to himself.”161  The court also held that “[o]ne who takes part in 
such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious 
and necessary.”162 
In 1942, when Hudson was decided, there were no mascots for any 
MLB teams.163  Thus, there were no T-shirt cannons or hotdog launches, only 
baseball.  Hudson, then, protected ballpark owners from almost all negligence 
that may have occurred in their stadium by their employees, as only the sport 
of baseball was transpiring while spectators were in the ballpark.164  There 
was no differentiation between the inherent risks of the sport of baseball and 
the inherent risks of attending a game in person because the risks were the 
same.  Using the court’s logic in Hudson – that one accepts the inherent dan-
gers of attending a game of baseball as long as they were obvious and neces-
sary – means that in contemporary terms, one accepts the inherent dangers 
posed by fan interactions by mascots and ballpark employees as long as they 
are obvious and necessary. 
The hotdog launch is an obvious inherent danger of attending an MLB 
game for two reasons.  It is obvious because it has been a constant of Royals 
home games since 2000, and because the hotdog launch occurs between in-
nings, when no baseball is being played.165  Fans stand and shout in excite-
ment for Sluggerrr to throw or launch a free hotdog to them.166  Not only is 
there no baseball being played, but also fans in the general area must implied-
ly give other fans notice that some event is happening near them.  The hotdog 
launch may not be considered necessary in that is not absolutely needed for 
 
 160. Id. at 324.  Mr. Coomer also had attended many baseball games and had full 
knowledge of the dangers the sport presents for spectators.  Coomer v. Kan. City 
Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 161. Hudson, 164 S.W.2d at 319. 
 162. Id. at 323 (quoting Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 
174 (N.Y. 1929)). 
 163. Kevin Wells, The 35 Official Mascots of Major League Baseball Teams, 
COMMUNITIES DIGITAL NEWS (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.commdiginews.com/sports/
the-35-official-mascots-of-major-league-baseball-teams-14119/.  Mr. Met, the New 
York Mets’ official mascot, was the first MLB mascot and was introduced in 1964.  
Id. 
 164. The obvious exception would be structural issues, such as if the upper deck 
was negligently maintained and fell on spectators.  Another exception could be serv-
ing spoiled foods.  See Paula Lavigne, Bugs, Mold on Menu at K.C. Stadiums, ESPN 
(Nov. 14, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11854523/critical-
food-safety-violations-kansas-city-pro-stadiums. 
 165. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 188. 
 166. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., Nos. WD 73984, WD 74040, 
2013 WL 150838, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), transferred, 437 S.W.3d 184 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc) (“[P]eople behind [Mr. Coomer] were cheering and yelling for [Slug-
gerrr] to throw hot dogs to them.”). 
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the sport of baseball, but it may be considered necessary in that it represents 
needed fan interactions that fans pay for when they attend MLB games.  
Spectators expect more than just the sport of baseball when they attend a 
game in person. 
In Anderson, decided in 1950, the court held that no negligence is found 
“where a baseball game is being conducted under the customary and usual 
conditions prevailing in baseball parks” and that the circumstances pleaded in 
that case did not “impose upon the defendant a duty to warn . . . against haz-
ards which are necessarily incident to baseball and are perfectly obvious to a 
person in possession of his faculties.”167  In 1950, there were still no mascots 
for MLB teams.168  Thus, the statement “inherent dangers of the sport of 
baseball” in 1950 is the same as the statement “inherent dangers of attending 
a baseball game” in general today. 
Today, the use of a mascot in the MLB is quite customary and is a usual 
feature of baseball parks across the United States.  Only three teams in the 
MLB do not have a mascot.169  The use of a mascot is a practice that is neces-
sary to attract fans to baseball stadiums.  The antics of such mascots, unless 
performed recklessly, should be perfectly obvious to a person in possession 
of his faculties.  These events are so obvious that “[i]t would . . . [be] absurd, 
and no doubt . . . resented by many patrons, if the ticket seller, or other em-
ployees, . . . warned each person entering the park that he or she would be 
imperiled by”170 the actions of such mascots.  This is true because most mas-
cot events, like the hotdog launch, are conducted between innings or when 
there is no baseball being played on the diamond. 
An example of a mascot acting recklessly and thus causing an incident 
ripe for litigation is in Lowe v. California League of Prof. Baseball.171  It can 
be argued that the mascot in Lowe acted recklessly, or acted in reckless disre-
gard of the safety of another, and satisfied the definition espoused by the Su-
preme Court of Missouri.  The court stated that recklessness occurs when a 
defendant “intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to 
the other to do” while “knowing or having reason to know of facts which 
would lead a reasonable man to realize that the actor’s conduct not only cre-
 
 167. Anderson v. Kan. City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo. 1950); see 
supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. 
 168. Wells, supra note 163. 
 169. Id.  Only the Dodgers, Angels, and Yankees do not have a mascot in the 
MLB.  Id. 
 170. Anderson, 231 S.W.2d at 173.  The original quote is “[i]t would have been 
absurd, and no doubt . . . resented by many patrons, if the ticket seller, or other em-
ployees, had warned each person entering the park that he or she would be imperiled 
by vagrant baseballs in unscreened areas.”  Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 
S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). 
 171. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
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ates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high 
degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him.”172 
In Lowe, the mascot “Tremor,” a seven-foot-tall dinosaur with a tail, re-
peatedly hit a fan with his tail mid-game, which caused the fan to be distract-
ed and subsequently hit by a foul ball.173  Tremor’s tail hit Mr. Lowe in the 
back of the head and shoulders for nearly two minutes during the game before 
Mr. Lowe turned around to watch the mascot’s antics.174  A reasonable per-
son, even a reasonable person acting as a mascot, should realize that there is 
an increase of an unreasonable risk of bodily harm from a seven-foot tall 
mascot acting in a way that distracts fans mid-game from the already danger-
ous sport of baseball.  Clearly, the mascot in Lowe substantially increased the 
likelihood of substantial harm for spectators by distracting spectators mid-
game. 
Attending a baseball game in person is more than simply watching the 
baseball game.  It is a “full-scale entertainment experience.”175  Baseball fans 
assume the risk for not only the dangers of the sport of baseball, but for all of 
those in-stadium events that occur at the ballpark.  Common sense presumes 
that if a spectator is on alert for the dangers of the sport of baseball, that spec-
tator is on alert for a hand-tossed hotdog. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court of Missouri should have 
ruled in favor of the Kansas City Royals.  Instead of protecting the MLB 
teams in Missouri, the court declined to extend the protections of the baseball 
rule for the actions of mascots and employees of ballpark owners.  To com-
pensate for potential litigation, teams will be forced to either increase ticket 
prices or eliminate the interactions that draw some fans attend the games.  
The court chose the narrow view that “inherent risks” of baseball are strictly 
confined to only the risks of the sport of baseball itself, rather than the broad-
er view that “inherent risks” of attending a baseball game include all those in-
game experiences that a spectator may witness while at a game.  Further liti-
gation will reveal whether Coomer will impact minor league baseball games 
as well as other sporting events, such as National Hockey League games.  
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 173. Lowe, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 109. 
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